China, US have much to gain from healthy competition

Delivering(v|交付，发表，投掷，传达) a speech at the George Washington University on May 26, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed(vt|重申) the Joe Biden administration’s “3C” policy toward China: cooperate(vi|合作), compete(vi|参加比赛，竞争) and contest(n|比赛|v|争夺|vt|争取赢得). He also summed(n|全部，总和) up(sum up| 总结) Biden’s approach(v|靠近|n|接近，途径) to China with three words, “invest, align and compete”.

Obviously, the Biden administration stresses “competition” in the US’ strategy vis-à-vis China for the 2020s decade. This matches the current freezing reality of bilateral(adj|双边的) ties across the Pacific(adj|大平洋的|n|太平洋)－China and the US are indeed competing for trade, investment, technology, innovation, influence(vt|影响|n|影响) and geostrategy(n|地理), to name a few(to name a few| 仅举几个例子).

Blinken should be commended(v|称赞) for including “cooperation” in the US’ policy toward China. This indicates the ongoing(adj|仍在进行的) political(adj|政治的，政府的) correction in the incumbent(adj|现任的|n|在职的) administration, differentiating it from that of the previous administration.

While US President Joe Biden has carried on much of the policy left by his predecessor(n|前辈) Donald Trump, he has shown an intention(n|目的，意图) to build guardrails(n|护栏) to protect China-US competition, not to derail(vi|脱轨|vt|使脱轨) it.

There are many regional(adj|地区性的，局部|n|分部) and global challenges－climate(n|气候) change, the Korean Peninsula(n|半岛) nuclear issue, Iran’s position in resetting the nuclear deal, the COVID-19 pandemic(adj|全国性的|n|大规模流行病), global fight on terrorism(n|恐怖主义的), not to mention the food and energy crises looming(n|织布机|v|阴森地逼近) large on the horizon(n|地平线). To address each and every of them, the world needs China’s participation(n|参加) and contribution.

Yet the list of competition seems longer: values, rights, fairness(n|公平), rules, trade, market, supply chains, innovation, high-tech decoupling(vt|分离), geostrategic(adj|地缘政治的) competition in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, apart from outer space. In Blinken’s vision(n|视力，视野，视觉|v|幻觉), such a strategic competition has much to do with the survival(n|存活，生存) of the post-World War II liberal(n|开明的人,自由主义|adj|慷慨，自由主义的) world order.

China certainly has benefitted from the postwar order since launching reform and opening-up. Still, Beijing has to improve its external(adj|外面的) environment, especially in its neighborhood. For this purpose, Chinese leaders have reiterated(vt|重申，反复讲，反复做) that the door of China’s opening-up will only open wider and wider.

The rule-based international order is not only applicable(adj|适用的，合适的) to China and few other countries, but also the rest of the world. As the key architect of such a system, the United States has equal obligation(n|义务) to follow the terms(n|术语，任期，期限|vt|把...称为|pl|关系) of the existing rule-based international order, primarily defined by the United Nations Charter.

It was the US that refused to ratify(vt|批准，认可) the Kyoto Protocol, and quit the Paris Agreement, Joint(n|关节|adj|联合的|v|结合) Comprehensive(adj|综合的，有充分理解的|n|综合测验) Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. And although under the Biden administration, the US has rejoined the Paris climate accord and is considering getting back with Iran in the breached(v|破坏|n|破裂) 2015 nuclear deal while working to build the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(n|繁荣), who knows whether it will not withdraw(v|取款，撤退，收回，退出) from them again.

Also, it was the US that aligned with China during World War II and helped reunite(v|重逢，再联合) Taiwan with the motherland. But during the Korean War (1950-53), the then US president said the status of Taiwan was uncertain. And it is the US that seems to be breaking its promise and international law that there is only one China and Taiwan is an integral(adj|必需的，必不可少的) part of China.

Sino-US relations were normalized in the 1970s, and are based on the one-China policy and the three joint communiques(n|公报) signed by the two sides.

But the US soon passed the “Taiwan Relations Act” and subsequently(adv|随后，后来) took its policy of “TRA plus three communiques”. In 1982, when the US signed the third communique with Beijing on arms sale to Taiwan, it also made “six assurances(n|信心，自信，保险)”. The Trump administration was the first to uphold(v|维护，支持，举起，赞成) them openly, and now Biden defines his one-China policy as “TRA, three communiques plus six assurances”.

Despite(prep|尽管，不顾|n|侮辱|v|憎恨，轻视) that, the US is welcome to invest in China, and should lift(v|升起|n|电梯) the hurdles(n|障碍，跨栏用栏|v|跨栏) for China to invest in the US, because the more they invest, the more they would benefit from each other. And through competition, the two sides could improve the quality of their products and services－and even conceive some cooperative(adj|协作的，合作的|n|合作社) investments, which could prevent other counties from aligning with one side or the other.

In short, we welcome healthy investment for constructive competition and the application of a rule-based order to all competitors(n|参赛者，竞争对手).